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taken from him. 
was denied June 14, 
l., vott>d for a 
Xo. Gl75. Jn Bauk . 
. fAMES G. BHYAXT. as Director of Emplo;•mt'Ilt, et a1., Peti-
v. INDT'STIUAL ..:\CCIDEN'l' COMMISSION, 
Hespomle11t. 
(1] Unemployment Insurance---Ineligibility for Unemployment Dis-
ability Benefits.-'l'he clear intent of the Legislature in enact-
Insurance ~ 207(b) (Stats. Jst Ex. Sess. 
ch. § 1, as amended in 1947; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 8780d) is to disqualify an applicant for unemployment dis-
ability benefits for a period of unemployment which is due to 
a for which he is entitled to workmen's compensation. 
[2] Id.-Right to Unemployment Disability Benefits.--The Legisla-
Lab. Code, § 4903 , in 1947, did not change 
receive disability 
a means for the recovery by the 
Stabilization on final determina-
the Industrial Aceident Commission of the eligibility of 
an for workmen's compensation, of the amount of 
unemployment disability benefits paid to the applicant hy the 
former commission during the period of uncertainty pending 
such final de termination. 
220. 
Insurance, § 8.1; 
1V orkmen's Compensation, 
tPrnn.Cl-r"'-rv and permanent u"'"u•1uc.) 
a does not indicate 
intended to have 
ployment Insurance 
effect on the construction 
to review an order 
Commission awarding compensation for 
of award refusing to allow elairn of lien 
pensation annulled with directions. 
]'red N Howser and Edmund G. 
eral, Chas. \V. Johnson, H. 




Amicus Curiae on behalf of Peti. 
Edmund ,f. '1'. and Robert Ball for 
Respondent. 
Charles P. Seully, as Amieus Curiae on behalf of Hespondent. 
SCHAUER, the Direetor of Employment 
and the Department of Employment, seek review of an award 
of respondent Industrial Aeeident and annul-
ment of the portion of the a\Yard whieh denies 
daim of a lien against certain workmen's compensation 
awarded to Herbert R. \Vade. On ,Tune \Vade sus-
tained an injury arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment. He instituted before the Industrial 
Accident Commission to recover 
During the pendency of such 
See 27 Cal.Jur. 546. 
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mrn's 
Prtitiom•rs rontrnd that are entitled 
1 o a lien against workmen for the entire amount 
paid as unemployment disability regardll'ss of whether 
the 'WOrkmen ,,,as a\-rarded for temporary dis-
ability or for permanent disahilit;;-. The Industrial Accident 
Commission eontencls that in every case it has discretion as to 
whether it will a1lo•x a lien against workmen's compensation; 
that when• the (•1aimrr1 lien is for nnemployment disabilit:· 
benefits it would hr an abusr of discretion to deny the lirn 
for benefits paid (luring a period of temporary disability, but 
that thr eommission "is fully justified" in denying a lien for 
benefits paid during a prriod of permanent disability. Amicus 
euriae State Federation of J_,abor eontends that as a rnatter 
of law an unemployed. disabled applicant is entitled to both 
nnemployment disahilit.'· betwfits and \Yorkmen 's permanent 
disabilit;' Tiesolntion of the variom; ronten-
tions depends npon of the l;abor Corlf• rm(l tl1e 
I'Hemplo;vnwni Tmmrancr Aet I 8 Derring's Gen. T1aws, Ar1 
~7RO(l). Com:i<leration of the prrtinent statntor.\· provisions 
]pads to the conelusion that the ]Wtitioners as a matter of la\Y 
'The Insurance Act (:l Deering's Gen. 
§ par. i!efines ''unemployment compensation bene-
fits' a;;'' money payments ... to nn 1memplo.''Nl indiYidual with 
respect to his wage losses due to as a result of illness or 
otl1er disability resulting in such lwing nnaYailn hle or una hle 
to work due to snch illness OJ' disability.'' 
"The Labor Code ((> 4903, par. (f) quoted infra), provides for such 
a lien. 
any ·week ·which 
of state." 
85.) The committee recommended 
program "to pay benefits to individ-
because illness or injury 
otherwise made" p. 126; ital-
further recommended ''That no disability 





zation Commission] finds 
to receive ... benefits 
received or is entitled 









amount to be as 
services in con-
nt>etion with the claim for Reasonable 
expcnst>s for medical treatment of the industrial 
Heasonable value of expenses 
lllJniT. R0asonable burial expens0s of deceased 
(e) Heasonable expenses of deserted wife or minor 
children. Paragraph , added in 1947, reads, "The amount 
of unemployment compensation benefits which have 
been paid under or pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance 
Act in those cases a determination under 
Division 4 of this there was whether such 
benefits were payable under that act or payable hereunder.'' 
Paragraph , added in 1949, "The amount of unem-
ployment compensation benefits paid erroneously to the in-
jured employee for a period for which he was unable to work 
and for which he received total disability payments 
under this division." 
[2] It does not appear that the by 
paragraph to section 4903 of the Labor Code in 1947, 
ehanged the of an applicant to receive 
disability benefits; it a means for the Unem-
ployment Stabilization Commission to recover such benefits 
when it was finally determined the Industrial Accident 
Commission that the was entitled to workmen's 
The reason for such means is 
obvious. An is not entitled to unemployment dis-
ability benefits for a period of unemployment which, according 
to the findings of the Unemployment Stabilization Commis-
tion under 
whether such benefits were 
Insurance or 
[3] It is the commission 's3 section 
4903 proyides that it '' ' allow a lien and because '' ' 
is permissive" (Lab. § 1 , it "may" in its discretion 
refuse to allow liens under section 4903. 'I'he eases 
suggest that the commission's ''discretion'' as to liens under 
paragraphs through of section though wide, 
does not inelude "discretion" to disallow a lien 
where it is established that the lien claimant did furnish 
servi(~es or living expenses of value: Independence Indem. Co. 
v. Industrial Arc. Com. (1935), 2 CaL2d 397, 404, 407 [41 
P.2d 320] Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1938), 10 Cal.2d 567, 578 P.2d 1058]; v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com. (1920), 47 Cal.App. 190, 192 [190 P. 373); 
Safway Steel etr. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn. (1942), 55 CaL 
App.2d 388, 389 [ 130 P.2d 484] ; Bentley v. Industrial Ace. 
Cmn. (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 547, 549 [171 P.2d 'rhe 
eommi8sion relies on D1: Pasqua v.lnclustrial Ace. Cmn. (1949), 
14 Cal.Comp. Cases 251, 252, in support of its contention that 
section 4903 gi ,·es it ''discretion'' to disallow a proved lien. 
fn that ease there were proper for disallowing the 
lien, and any that the commission had "discre-
tion" to deny a proved lien was not necessary to its decision. 
A goorl example of the sort of discretion whieh the eommission 
has under seetion 4903 is v. J[elly , 6 CaLComp. 
Cases 307. There the unpaid balance of compensation was in-
8nffkient to pay the claimed liens for rent and attorney's fee. 
'rhe commission divided the amount available pro rata between 
the two lien claimants on the theory that this was the most 
equitable way to obtain the desired that not to dis-
'The word "commission" as used in this discussion, unless otherwise 
indicated, refers to the Industrial Accident Commission. 
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time 
argues as follo-ws: Permant:nt 
intended to the employe 
with sustemmee while he rehabilitates himself and to 
his new 
JJlotor Vehicles v. Ace. 
), 14 Ca1.2d ]89, 192 P.2d 131]). Temporary 
since it is measured by a fraction of 
wages §§ 4653, 4654) is intended to partially eom-
prnsate for loss of ,,·ages. cnemployment disability brnefits 
too are intended "to compensate in for the wage loss 
sustained individuals unemployed because of sickness or 
Deering's Gen. IJaws. r\et 8780d, § 150). There-
fore, it is proper that the 1vorkman should not receive both 
temporary disability and unemployment dis-
ability benefits at the same since both are intended to 
for the same loss; it is equally proper that the 
Workman should receive unemployment disability benefits 
(just as he might receiYe during the time he is re-
ceiving permanent disability eompensation and adjusting him-
self to his new, disabled status. The eommission asserts, fur-
ther. that paragraph (b 1 of section 207 of the Unemployment 
lnsnranee ,\et (qnoted s11pm. pp. 218-2HI) does not precludr 
simultaneous payment of disability compensation 
and unemployment disability benefits, beeause the perman(>nt 
disability r;omprnsation is not payable "for any week of un-
employment dtH' primarily to a disability"; rather. it is 
pa?ablr becausr of the 's changed, permanently dis-
Abled condition. This tortuous eonstruction reaches a result 
whieh, as we have alrrady im1ieated, nppears to us to be eon-
trary to the intent. Sneh to be snrP, agrres 
with Industrial Accident Commission policy whieh has a 
rpasonable theoretical basis. But it is the Legislature, not the 
eommission. whieh sets the limits within which the eommission 
ean arlopt and rarry out 
'l'he State Fe(leration of T1abor urges that the Unem-
;md the I1abor Code 
benefits the 
the purpose of 
agTees \Yith the 







of section 4fl03 of the f_~abor Code to mean, as indi-
the bracketed that the Industrial Aeci-
is not'' 
'' becanse it is not a 
a lien ''The amount of un-
benefits pay-
which have been paid 
Insurance Act in those case:;; 
Division 4 of this 
and 
his age at the time 
to the diminished 
pete in an open labor market.'' 
atldecL) 'fhat is to say, 
for wages actually lost while 
pairment of """"""''n" 
lyzed by this court in Department 111otor Vehicles v. In-
dustrial Accident 14 Cal.2d 189, 191 [93 P.2d 
131] : '''I' he rule is well recognized that, 
ployee is entitled to an award for 
out regard to the wages after the injury. 
the inability to return to reemployment is not a test for an 
allowance of permanent disability is determined by the Labor 
Code itself. Section 4660 thereof provides that, in determin-
ing the percentage of permanent disability, account shall be 
taken of the nature of the physical or disfigurement, 
the occupation of the employee, and his age at the 
time of such 
"In Postal Tel. etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 213 Cal. 
644 [3 P.2cl 6], the rule is announced that wages earned by 
and paid to an injured employee subsequent to an a-ward of 
compensation for a could not be credited 
against such holding, in accordance with the rule 
followed in several industrial that the disability re-
ferred to in the statute was not such as impaired 
pou~er but embraced any loss of physi-
cal functions which detracted from the former efficiency in 
the ordinary pursuits of life. It is the prospective loss of 
future power under the handicap of physical 
impairment that is to be considered and to do the 
exact work done by the 
measure of disability." (Italics added.) It is clear therefore 
that temporary disability payments under workmen's com-
pensation laws are a substitute for wages lost by the em-
is dear. 
week in 




because of his 
to perform his 
Insurance 
Stats. p. 1226, as amended, § 201. Italics added.) 
'l'he amount of b('nefits is computed on the basis of the wages 
}ntyabk § § 20:5), as noted in the majority 
opinion, the refereuce is to the "weeks" the employee re-
e<,ives benefits under the \Yorlnnen 's Compensation Act, all 
pointing to the conelusion that vv-ages, not earning capacity, 
is the basis for computing nnemployment disability benefits. 
That pet'lnanent disabiLity payments should not be deducted 
from unemployment disability payments, or vice versa, is 
patently sensible. 'l'hc former are for the loss for life of the 
<:apacity to earn a living. 'l'hey are not apportioned according 
to c<'rtain periods of ti tnt>, that is, one installment does not 
represent the payment for the loss of earning capacity for 
the instaUment period. The latter, however, are directly 
apportioned to each week and on the basis of the wages that 
would have been paid for that week had the employee not been 
disabled. There is, therefore, insufficient similarity between 
the two to justify balancing one against the other. 
The only anS>Yer made by the majority opinion to the fore-
going eonstruction of the statute is that it is "tortuous." 
On the contrary it is wholly reasonable and eompelled by the 
rNpiir·ement that workm<m 's c-ompensation Jmvs be liberally 
eonstrned to pres0ne their benefits to their beneficiaries. 
Code, § 3202.) 
F'urthermore, my eonstruction of the act is necessitated by 
the theory of workmen's eompensation that industry shall 
bear the burden of industrial injuries. Cal.Jur. 256.) 
Under the Unemployment Insuranee Act ( § 44) the em-
ployee eontributrs to the fund from which the benefits are 
payablr. 'ro that extr.nt, not inclustry, is bearing the 
cost of an industrial injury. 
37 C.2d-~ 
where the +m .. ~A?~ 
exeeeds per cent of the 
the injured employee shall 75 per 
eent of snch permanent disability payment in addition to the 
temporary disability payment. ' (Stats. ch. 1335.) 
r n 1 947 the partial recovery was inereased as follows: ''Where 
nn injury causes both temporary and disability, 
the injured employee is entitled to compensation for any 
disability sustained him in addition to any 
payment received by such for temporary 
disability; provided, however, that where the permanent 
disability rating is 707o or greater, it slmli be conclusively 
presumed that temporary disability did not exceed 104 weeks.'' 
(Stats. 1947, ch. 1132.) .B'inally in 1949, the Legislature 
went the whole way and allowed both and perma-
nent disability compensation to be paid. It stated: "\Vhere an 
injury causes both temporary and permanent disability, the 
injured employee is entitled to compensation for any perma-
nent disability sustained by him in addition to any payment 
received by s~tch 'tnjm·ed employee for temporary disability." 
(Stats. 1949, ch. 107. Italics added.) Here is a clear man-
date of the Legislature that the pennanent disability com-
pensation shall not be diminished by any payment of tempo-
rary disability compensation. 'rhat is to say, the "loss of 
wages' disability compensation-shall not reduce 
the "loss of earning capacity' disability com-
pensation. But under the strained construction of the statutes 
gi \'en in the majority opinion that mandate is completely 
ignored. It says that the unemployment disability payment, 
which is for the loss of wages , the same as temporary 
<1isability compensation, must be ded'Icted from the perma-
nent <lisability compensation allowed for loss of earning 
CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 227 
C.2d 227; 231 P.2d 26] 
with one hand and take 
rrhe Industrial Aeeideut Commission construed the statutes 
lwre involved in accord with the views herein and 
eoncede that the policy of the Commission in so 
the statutes has a "reasonable theoretical basis." 
What 1s meant the latter phrase is not clear in view of 
1llr and eonelusion reached in the majority opinion. 
If it is meant that the placed upon the statutes 
b~' the Commission is then it should be adopted 
h.v this conrt. rrhat such construction is reasonable and not 
'' tortnous'' 1s obvious from the foregoing discussion. 
For the reasons I would affirm the a>Yard. 
F. Xo. 18:2M. Jn Bank 
Cl'l'Y AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. 
THE STJPBRIOH COUHT OF THB CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN F'HANCISCO et al., Respondents. 
Witnesses- Privileged Communications- Physician and Pa-
tient.~· The under Code Civ. Proc., 
~ 1881 no treatment is contcm-
exists between plaintiff 
eontcntion that 
107 A.L.R. 1495. 
